lawyers." 6 Substantive English law, being nevertheless customary (albeit at root Norman custom), was not written down in a comprehensive way. Rather it was based on a series of writs (that is, writings) that were "forms of action," one for each of the multitude of law proceedings that a plaintiff might wish to bring. But each writ presumed a particular wrong and a particular remedy, and it was up to the plaintiff to choose the right one on pain of having his remedy denied. 7 These forms of action also lingered in English law until legal reform finally eliminated most of the last vestiges in the twentieth century.
The writs, though in writing, were not themselves statements of substantive law, and indeed the substantive law of England cannot be said to have been written down until the publication of the treatise known as Bracton. 8 But even though its author or authors, knew some Roman law and were influenced by it, the book was explicitly based on court records, thereby recognizing a central principle of the common law that the law is at base what the judges say it is. 9 New writs were regularly being invented to meet new felt needs, statutes were occasionally passed, and the king's imposition of the feudal land system was in effect creating law, but common law techniques of finding and extending law had not yet developed. 10 Later, common law judges began to elaborate on their rulings with written opinions. These opinions, which sought their justification in earlier cases, began to create the distinctive approach of the common law that characterizes it even today. This approach treats formerly decided cases as controlling precedent and requires judges to reason from case to case, distinguishing cases that could be said to be conflicting precedents, in order to find the controlling principles for new fact situations. It is this process of reasoning from case to case that is what most people today think of as the essence of the common law. Indeed, today the words common law are usually taken to mean judge-made law, rather than just unified law.
To be sure, the English parliament began to pass important statutes, but they were 6. Zweigert and Kötz (1992, p. 191) . 7. Milsom (1969, pp. 22-32) . 8. Some scholarship raises doubts about how much of the book Henry de Bracton actually wrote; see Tierney (1963) .
9. Dawson (1968, p. 2).
regarded for some centuries, at least by some judges, as embellishments to the body of common law. Indeed, it was understood that statutes that contravened the common law rule were to be narrowly construed to avoid changing more than parliament had clearly intended. But in time it became customary that statutes had their own independent status, independent of the common law, and that statutes could even change common law rules.
Nonetheless, judges used methods of interpreting ambiguities in statutes that echoed their methods in nonstatutory fields. In particular, judges relied on earlier decisions on the interpretation of a particular statute and generally considered these earlier rulings as binding on later courts. These characteristics, which are recognized even today by every beginning law student in common law countries as the common law method, can be contrasted with the civil law system that came to reign on the European continent.
Civil Law
The civil law system developed only slowly. In the early centuries of the common law, continental western Europe was still divided among the remnants of the Roman empire, with customary local law still governing issues involving land, contracts, torts, and the like. This remained true even with the rising importance of the Holy Roman Empire, which exercised little of the sovereign power that is normally associated with law, that power remaining in the various kingdoms and principalities within the Holy Roman Empire.
Nonetheless, over the centuries interest grew in continental western Europe in
Roman law, leading to what was known as the "reception" of Roman law. This reception occurred predominantly in the German-speaking areas of Europe (which was the territory where the Holy Roman Empire of the German Peoples, as it was called, had its primary influence). But Roman law remains to this date an important influence on the law of, for example, Scotland.
The interest in Roman law led to a situation in which its concepts and procedures were overlaid on local traditions, being especially influential in areas such as contracts and torts. Law still varied from place to place, but students were increasingly taught 10 . Hamowy (2003, p. 249) states that more than 470 writs had been created by the end of the reign of Henry II, but that the creation of new writs "had stopped altogether" by the end of the fourteenth century because by that time "common law judges opposed the issuance of writs that had no precedent." Roman law; hence, a sense of continuity and unity grew in what became known as the jus commune-a kind of common law at least for German-speaking parts of the continent (though quite different from the common law of England). 11 Curiously the Roman law texts were those collected in the Corpus Juris Civilis of the Eastern emperor Justinian I in the sixth century, after the collapse of the Western empire. The split between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation states and the rise of nationalism led to national codifications, the first in Denmark in 1683. By the time Napoleon came to power in France in 1799, the codification movement was well advanced. Napoleon set out to promulgate the codification of all codifications, the French Civil Code, which went into effect in 1804.
Napoleon took a great interest in his code. He personally chaired many of the meetings of the consul committee reviewing the work of the drafters. No doubt Napoleon, the man of action, insisted on the practicality of the code and perhaps its clarity and simplicity. 12 He certainly was proud of his work; after the defeat at Waterloo, he proclaimed: "My true glory is not that I have won 40 battles; Waterloo will blow away the memory of those victories. What nothing can blow away, what will live eternally is my civil code." 13 That was perhaps why Napoleon wanted the code understandable by the common man. But it was drafted by professors and reflected their approach, rather than that of men of practical affairs, and certainly not that of merchants.
14 Being the product of professors, the French Civil Code was abstract, reflecting the "abstract reasoning [that] had characterized the French approach to law and to life in general" during the Age of Reason. But its generality and it emphasis on understandability meant that one had often to take into account a variety of provisions to determine the legal rules covering a given set of facts. Its very generality gave it staying power, with no important changes made until 1880 (except for the repeal of divorce in 1816 after the Catholic monarchy was restored). 15 And indeed even today the core provisions of Napoleon's code remain in place despite increasingly numerous statutory 11. Rheinstein and Glendon (2003 20. Ernst Rabel, the foremost comparative law scholar of his generation, held a set of lectures in his new home in the United States after leaving Germany, in which he was unsparing in his comparison of the French and German civil codes. On the question of style, he described the French Civil Code: "The language, crystalline and beautiful, has not had its equal before or afterward; there have been celebrated French poets who like to read some chapters for encouragement in prose" (Rabel 1949-50a, p. 109) . For the German code, he reserved pejorative descriptions: "ponderous," "overaccurate pedantry," "innumerable wheels and gadgets," and "ugly" (Rabel 1949-50b, pp. 270, 275) .
For the purposes of considering contemporary economic development issues in this book, the bulk of our attention on the influence of civil law can be focused largely on the French Civil Code. We can do so for quite pragmatic reasons. Putting aside the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, few developing countries are influenced by German law, and those few-such as South Korea and Taiwan-are already high-income countries. (Of course, South Korea and Taiwan had much lower incomes just a few decades ago and thus their legal development would merit investigation.) Scandinavian countries had a few colonies, but today no developing country is regarded as being part of the Scandinavian legal family. The dominant influence in private law (as opposed to, say, constitutional law) in the great bulk of today's less developed world came from either English common law or French civil law.
Legal Origins as a Theory of Development
The essence of the legal origins approach, as applied to economic development, is to use regressions to show that the origin-say, English common law or French civil law-of a particular country's law is associated with that country's rate of economic growth. An alternative approach to the relevance of legal institutions to a country's economic growth looks at the role of "governance." It includes an important role for the rule of law in overall governance. The two approaches complement each other, and I take up the governance approach below as a useful contrast to the legal origins approach.
Most of the legal origins work began in finance. An early, and perhaps still the most influential, legal origins article is "Law and Finance," published in 1998 by four economists-Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny-whose work has become so well known that they are universally cited as LLSV. 22 Even though the four authors did not set out to apply their work to economic development policies, it has often been interpreted as throwing important light on economic development outcomes.
Building on earlier work showing that stronger financial sectors led to more rapid 21. The statement in the text ignores China, which was never a colony and never felt the need to adopt Western law, as did Japan in the late nineteenth century, at least in part.
22. La Porta and others (1998).
economic growth in the economy as a whole, LLSV used a sample of forty-nine countries to show a statistical relationship between the character of legal rules concerning the financial sector and the origin of a country's laws. 23 The most interesting part of this body of research was its finding that countries whose law derived from the common law had stronger legal systems for financial development and hence faster economic growth than civil law countries. An obvious conclusion was that the common law provided a superior legal base for a country (and this was true whether new countries received their law through conquest or colonization).
Equally striking was the finding that French law was the worst among civil law systems for the development of the financial sector and that German and Scandinavian legal systems were situated between common law and French legal systems. And in a related 1997 article, "Legal Determinants of External Finance," (which was based on the same research involving the same countries), LLSV showed that common law origin countries had grown faster than French origin countries-4.30 percent per capita versus 3.18 percent.
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In their "Law and Finance" article, La Porta and his colleagues looked at "enforcement variables" such as the "efficiency of legal system," "rule of law," and so forth. But mostly they looked at substantive legal provisions, particularly rules concerning the protection of shareholders and creditors, finding that the common law countries offered the most protections, followed by the German and Scandinavian law countries, with French law countries trailing. The main body of their work was in the financial sector, raising perhaps a systemic issue about the policy implications of the legal origin work (important as the financial sector undeniably is to growth, particularly in the middle-income countries). Indeed, an oddity of their work on the financial sector was that it concerned primarily the protection of minority shareholders under corporate law and the protection of creditors in bankruptcy law. Yet both corporate and bankruptcy law are legal areas where most countries-common law and civil law countries alikerely on statutory law, much of it quite recent, rather than judge-made common law or 23 . Levine (2004) In the many economic articles, by LLSV and others, there is a broad recognition that the enforcement of contracts and the protection of property is vital to financial development. Although finance is an ideal sector to demonstrate this point, especially because the profusion of data lends itself to econometric methods of proof, it can hardly be doubted that the same principle should apply outside the financial area. After all, economies are more than finance, even if the concept of finance is interpreted broadly to include corporate governance; in the real economy, as opposed to the financial, the same principles should apply. One of the many legal areas outside financial markets where legal origin should therefore be important, but is much less studied in cross-country regressions, is the real estate sector. It is examined in a chapter on land in Part II . This is a particularly important sector in many developing countries where more than half the population works in the agricultural sector and where the growth of megacities has made security of urban real estate, and underlying concepts of title and registry, particularly important.
Although the legal origins literature is focused on financial markets, and especially on substantive legal rules concerning shareholder and creditor protection, LLSV do recognize, as noted above, that enforcement of the rules, and hence the role of the judiciary, is important. Their approach to using legal origin to study these issues is also discussed in Part II in a chapter on the judiciary. Obviously the judiciary has a role transcending the financial sector. Cross, in a thorough review of the arguments, came to the conclusion that whatever differences there may once have been between common law and civil law systems, "it would be surprising to see a remarkable effect from the nation's choice of common or civil law [and] , surely, the convergence between the approaches would have at least muted the effect of the distinct systems." 32 Cross does find a possible difference based on a greater independence of the judiciary in common law systems. In this respect,
Cross follows in the footsteps of Mahoney, whose work was briefly reviewed earlier in this chapter. Cross, however, is relying on a perception of judicial independence based on a World Economic Forum survey. His conclusion underscores again the greater importance of public law than private law in investigating legal origins.
The policy "take away" for developing countries from the Cross review is thus the need to focus on how a judiciary can be made more independent constitutionally and how judges can be enabled and encouraged to behave more independently. Any inquiry into policy implications has to go beyond regression results to the underlying mechanisms through which the law, the judiciary, and the legal profession influence the economy. Therefore, it is worth deepening the understanding of the possible role of legal origins in economic development. One way of doing so is to look at some of the factual anomalies in the studies and then to look for alternative explanations of differential rates of economic growth. But the reader should be aware that the purpose of such an examination is not to reach some final conclusion as to the validity of legal origins theory but rather to use the examination as an entry point to a deeper consideration of the relationship between legal institutions and economic development.
Some Anomalies
The legal origins literature does not purport to be a study of economic development. It treats developed countries and developing countries alike and simply asks whether certain origins are better for certain purposes. In the key legal origins article, all forty-nine countries, developed or developing, are treated as equal, including the origin countries themselves, and no consideration is given to the size of the population or to the geographical region. 34 The central inquiry is to determine which legal families have the best substantive law for financial development, using substantive legal criteria determined by the authors.
On the few occasions when the authors attempt to determine whether the countries differ based on their per capita income levels, they come to some surprising . For a detailed argument that any superiority of financial development in common law countries over civil law countries is to be explained by twentieth century economic destruction and national occupations rather than legal origins, see Roe (2006) . 41. Merryman (1996) .
operates. Noting that the most important aspect of the Napoleonic legal revolution was to limit the power of judges and particularly their ability to "make law," he pointed out that limiting the role of judges to make law by interpreting ambiguities in statutes was quickly perceived to be impracticable and that a number of fields of French law are in fact principally judge made. As Jolowicz explains, in France:
Development of law through judicial decisions, though not altogether new, came to be openly recognised as a fact by all except, of course, the Judges themselves when they came to give the formal reasons for their decisions.
No one denies today, either for France or for Germany, that great areas of the law are in truth the products of the courts; if any common lawyer still supposes that for the civil law systems case law does not exist, a glance at any Continental textbook with its wealth of case citations will quickly convince him of his error. is more important than the substantive rules of law is one that recurs throughout this book, but for now the important point is that the legal origins literature indirectly maligns the French legal system even as it actually operates in France, and it tends to lead the casual reader of that literature to erroneous conclusions about the rule-of-law challenges facing the developing world.
Factual Anomalies
Once one goes into the details of the legal origins literature, some important factual anomalies also emerge. Two stand out. The first is that, at least in the early studies, the focus was heavily on private law-especially corporate and commercial law-rather than what might seem far more important to economic growth, namely, public law-that is, constitutional law bearing on the powers of the government, administrative law bearing on the powers of the bureaucracy, regulatory law bearing on the way in which the government regulates business, and the like. individual citizen or enterprise. This is not to say that the details of corporate and commercial law are not important to economic growth; on the contrary, their importance is stressed in later chapters. But they are arguably less important to the concept of the rule of law, which in the economic sphere has much to do with the protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts. Lack of enforcement of property rights in the developing world has more to do with public law than with private law. The biggest threats to property rights are the state itself and favoritism toward friends of the government. Difficulties in enforcing contracts do not normally arise from weaknesses in substantive law.
The Coding Question: The Latin American Example
A second anomaly is that in the process of applying regression analysis-the coding of particular third world countries as, say, French law countries-is quite an oversimplification. 46 To see this point most easily, one has only to consider Latin America, which represents more than 40 percent of the French civil law countries in the LLSV legal origins database.
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First of all, Spain did not adopt its civil code until 1889, and until that time its private law was based on Roman law (although it did adopt a commercial code applicable to merchants' transactions in 1829). Hence, the law of property and contracts in Spanishand Portuguese-speaking Latin America (not only during the colonial period but also during the years when the newly independent countries were establishing their legal systems) was based on Roman law-which is exactly what the French civil code system was intended to replace. 48 Even after 1889 the Spanish Civil Code followed the French Civil Code only in the law of obligations (roughly, contracts and torts). In other words, well after the legal die had been cast in most of Latin America, the Spanish Civil Code codified indigenous Spanish rules, especially in family law and inheritance. While those legal areas are arguably not crucial for commercial growth, those countries maintained the family law and inheritance rules that kept together the traditional great families with 46. The authors recognized that their reliance on a standard legal source led to difficulties in some countries, but apparently the requirements of regression studies-necessitating that each country be assigned one and only one legal origin-required the oversimplification. See La Porta and others (1997 Sometimes these two anomalies-the emphasis on private law (civil and commercial) and the multiple origins of particular third world countries' law-interact.
As we have seen, the coding of the Law and Finance studies somewhat misrepresents the private law legal heritage in some important countries, and it certainly is based on a misconception when it comes to public law.
Legal Origins and Public Law
In Latin America there are two major public law influences, one from the United States and one from the Iberian peninsula. Indeed, certain characteristics of Latin American public law are special to the area, perhaps best explained as products of the history of the region.
The first and perhaps predominant influence on Latin American constitutions is the U.S. Constitution, which was certainly more important than the successive French constitutions. As Schlesinger and his colleagues noted: "Yet, common law ideas (especially the elements of common law entrenched in the U.S. Constitution) have had a considerable impact on Latin American legal systems, primarily in the area of public law. environment forced every enterprise, urban or rural, to operate in a highly politicized manner, using kinship networks, political influence, and family prestige to gain privileged access to subsidized credit, to aid various stratagems for recruiting labor, to collect debts or enforce contracts, to evade taxes or circumvent the courts, and to defend or assert titles to lands. Success or failure in the economic arena always depended on the relationship of the producer with political authorities-local officials for arranging matters close at hand and the central government of the colony for sympathetic interpretations of the law and intervention at the local level when conditions required it. Small enterprise, excluded from the system of corporate privilege and political favors, was forced to operate in a permanent state of semiclandestiny, always at the margin of the law, at the mercy of petty officials, never secure from arbitrary acts and never protected against the rights of those more powerful. 
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In the case of administrative law, while French law provides for acts of government administration to be reviewable, that review takes place only in specialized administrative courts and not in the regular judicial system (that is, administrative law is not reviewable by the ordinary courts that also handle cases among private parties).
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Just the opposite is true in most of Latin America. Many Latin American countries have developed a remedy, usually called amparo (similar to but broader than the English and American writ of habeas corpus) that can be used to attack a broad range of administrative acts. In fact, unlike most European countries that allow administrative acts to be reviewable only by a specialized administrative court, amparo can normally be brought in the ordinary court system. 70 One therefore could ask why Latin America is not coded for regression purposes in the same category as the United States, at least to the extent that the underlying theory of the rule of law in economic development depends on the relationship between the state and the economy.
If one looks to legal culture, it may be the case that even in public law, the legal culture of many Latin American countries leads to different results in public law controversies than one would anticipate by looking only at the rules on the books. And it 66. North (1990, p. 114 may be that the Latin American legal culture in some way can be said to reflect a French approach to the legal profession and the judiciary. But a defense of the legal origins approach on this subtle ground merely leads to a second set of questions that may be the most important ones when one begins to look for policy implications for developing countries.
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Still a different kind of anomaly arises from treating Anglo-Saxon countries as in the same box simply because they adopted the common law. Insofar as public law is concerned, one can ask-for example-why Britain and the United States should be governance than between FDI and macroeconomic variables," leading him to the conclusions that "maintaining macroeconomic stability ought to continue to be regarded as a necessary precondition for growth and for FDI, yet it is far from sufficient," and that "particular emphasis on governance factors is warranted, since at the present juncture it appears to constitute a binding constraint."
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Another important difference is that the governance inquiry has been much broader than the legal origins approach. In the minds of the governance analysts, there are three dimensions of governance of a country, each of which is in turn broken down into six dimensions: "voice and external accountability;" "political stability and lack of violence, crime, and terrorism;" "government effectiveness;" "lack of regulatory burden [sometimes abbreviated as regulatory quality];" "rule of law;" and "control of corruption."
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The core of the analysis in the succeeding chapters of this book is thus the fifth component, the rule of law, although elements of the other five components also play a role in some legal origins work. In turn, the governance research implicitly looks to factors other than legal origin, although it does provide some insight into the legal origins work product.
One aspect of the governance research is that it permits one to rank countries by In dealing with the issue of reverse causality, legal origins studies can rely on the analytical point that because the legal origin of a country was determined more than a century earlier, the country's current income level cannot determine its legal origin.
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Governance studies have no such recourse. However, governance researchers have used a different approach that allows them, in their judgment, to find not just that there was no reverse causality but "a large direct causal effect from better governance to improved development outcomes." Korea and Taiwan in Asia and Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia in Eastern Europe.
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A further virtue of the governance literature is that it includes some two hundred countries, whereas the key Law and Finance article included data on only forty-nine countries. Although forty-nine countries may be enough for an academic paper aimed at a general conclusion (and at the time a new perspective), serious problems arise when one is attempting to arrive at policy recommendations for a subset of those countriesnamely, developing countries. 86 Then questions about the selection criteria become important. The governance literature uses data from essentially all developing countries. The results show, for example, that in those countries, common law countries come out slightly ahead of civil law countries on three components (voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and rule of law); even with civil law countries on regulatory quality; and slightly behind civil law countries on political stability and control of corruption. 87 From this perspective, the public policy problem to be addressed in lowincome countries is governance across the board and not just the legal origin aspects of governance.
Even with respect to legal origin as such, Kaufman found that while there was, "evidence of a small but significant correlation between legal origins and governance" in the complete set of some two hundred countries, when he focused on the seventy-five lower-income countries, "the differences between common law and civil law essentially 85 . Kaufmann (2004, p. 147) . 86. The LLSV (La Porta and others 1998, p. 1117) criteria for inclusion required that the country have at least five domestic, nonfinancial, publicly traded firms with no government ownership in 1993. These criteria made sense for a study of the development of financial sectors without special focus on special issues involving developing countries but left out information that would be important if one were primarily interested in developing countries. disappear." Yet, as Kaufmann points out, it "is precisely within this group of countries, many of which exhibit dysfunctional governance, that the most daunting governance challenges lie." 88 In short, the concept of legal origins is interesting from a scholarly point of view, but from the point of view of public policy formation for the poorer developing countries, legal origin appears to be of dubious relevance.
In trying to understand these governance results, one must consider subjectivity and related survey issues. Kaufmann's answer to the subjectivity concern is that subjective measures of governance contain important information often not captured by objective indicators, particularly in emerging economies. 89 This answer is no doubt correct in view of the serious shortcomings of the LLSV "objective" indicators reviewed in this and later financial sector chapters, but there is still reason to consider the shortcomings of subjective measures.
For example, a judicial corruption question was: "In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with getting favorable judicial decisions?" A score of 1 means "common" and a score of 7 means "never." 90 Here, as in the legal origins work, policy implication issues arise: Bribes have both a supply and a demand side, and the research gives little insight into how to work to lower the incidence of judicial corruption. Especially when one is talking about judicial corruption, it is unclear how enforcement of anticorruption legislation can be achieved in those countries where it is most needed.
In the case of judicial independence, the respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with the following statement: "The judiciary in your country is independent from political influence of members of government, citizens, or firms." 91 These types of questions were asked of six thousand enterprises in more than one hundred countries, and therefore the answers are primarily a business view of the judiciary, which is certainly not the only view that counts and perhaps not even the most important one.
One therefore might be inclined to object that perceptions do not necessarily 88 . Kaufmann (2004, p. 147) . See also Kaufmann (2003 reflect reality, and to some extent that is no doubt true. 92 But perceptions can have independent force. If business firms believe that the courts are not independent, they are likely to make less use of the judiciary to resolve disputes. And if the dispute is with a governmental institution, they may be more likely to choose bribery as less expensive and more certain than litigation.
Although one might quarrel with the choice of business respondents, an important by-product of focusing on business perceptions is that Kaufmann and colleagues were able to construct an index of "crony bias"-defined as the business respondents' assessment of the special influence of firms close to the government as compared with the influence of their own trade association. Among the nonobvious results was that crony bias was substantially higher in Latin America than in the sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East-North Africa regions.
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What should one conclude to be the relative merits of the legal origin and governance approaches? The governance work suggests that the public policy implications in the rule-of-law area are complicated and that rule-of-law performance may well depend on institutions and organizations unrelated to the law; voice and accountability seem particularly important and can be influenced by legal rules, such as a constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and press. But at least one can say that while legal origin cannot be changed, the governance work adds greatly to our understanding of what rule-of-law problems need to be worked on in the developing world whatever the legal origin of the countries involved.
92. K. Davis (2004, p. 150 ), who provides a critical review of efforts to assess the rule of law in developing countries, has pointed out that some business respondents in surveys may not have been residents of the country in question and therefore their perceptions may not have been based on personal and direct knowledge.
93. See Hellman and Kaufmann (2002) .
